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Power balances, transnational elites, and local economic governance: the 
political economy of development in Medellín 
 
Abstract 
Applying a non-linear political economy analysis of power balances, institutional 
mechanisms, and elite structures, this study sheds light on the characteristics of Medellín’s 
economic development since the early 2000s. Elites with minimal technological capabilities 
and interests in promoting the advancement of transnational capitalism have successfully 
secured access to sources of power. These conditions (re)produce neoliberal logics of local 
governance that focus on economic growth in sectors with perceived global comparative 
advantages and on sustaining the particular power balances in Medellín’s political 
settlement. This has led to failures of generating positive forward and backward linkages 
for productivity growth of local firms, a local labour market marked by low wages and high 
employment elasticities, and large income inequalities. The local governance model that 
perpetuates productivity and inequality problems of the city is adopted as an opportunistic 
discourse of Medellín’s transnationalised capitalist elite in the larger neoliberal context of 
Colombia’s polity and economic policy agenda. In the absence of structural reforms 
targeting low wages and incentivising firms to develop technological capabilities, 
Medellín’s low productivity and high inequality problems are likely to persist. 
 
Introduction 
In the 1980s and early 1990s, Colombia’s second city Medellín became famous for being 
the ‘most violent city in the world’, as the Medellín Cartel brought terror to the streets of 
the city. Led by Pablo Escobar, the Cartel questioned the political and economic legitimacy 
of local institutions and the predominant power balances. Following the introduction of 
neoliberal reforms in Colombia during 1990s, what Hirschman (1981: 155) coined 
fracasomania – an obsession with seeing everything that preceded as a complete failure –, 
Medellín’s political economy recovered very slowly. With a severe economic and financial 
crisis hitting Colombia at the turn of the millennium, the economic and political viability of 
the city’s developmental trajectory remained fragile: Medellín’s violence rates continued to 
be high, the local economy experienced a recession with negative growth rates of around 
5%, and the urban unemployment rate rose over 20%.  
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However, between 2003 and 2014 growth of Medellín’s per capita gross domestic 
product (GDP) surpassed the average growth rate of Colombia’s economy by large 
margins. In 2014 Medellín’s GDP per capita grew by over 4.2%, making the city’s 
economy the fastest growing urban market in Latin America (Brookings, 2015). The truly 
remarkable success story of Medellín has recently been the subject of many scholarly and 
non-academic analyses. Most contributions come to the conclusion that the city’s 
development is nothing short of a ‘miracle’ for which the introduction of the ‘right’ 
institutional structures and ‘good’ governance reforms are responsible (see Bahl, 2012; 
Devlin and Chaskel, 2010; Gutiérrez et al., 2013; Maclean, 2014). In his article in this 
journal, Ivan Turok (2014: 557–8) finds that local leaders’ ‘deep commitment to social 
transformation… backed by investment in building organisational capacity, both within the 
public sector and among non-governmental organisations and social movements’ lie at the 
heart of Medellín’s transformation. 
However, and different from existing academic analyses of Medellín’s 
transformation, this article studies the historically evolved distribution of power, local 
institutional changes, and elite interests to understand the dynamics behind the city’s 
economic development. As such, this paper explores the explanatory value of the so-called 
political settlements literature. Pioneered by Mushtaq Khan (1995), the political settlements 
framework is a critical analytical political economy approach arguing that there are no 
‘good’ or ‘bad’ institutions to achieve development. Rather, developmental outcomes 
depend on the particular political settlement, which describes ‘a combination of power and 
institutions that is mutually compatible and also sustainable in terms of economic and 
political viability’ (Khan, 2010: 4). 
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Applying this political settlements framework to the analysis of elite structures, 
power balances and the formal and informal institutional mechanisms, this study sheds light 
on the particular characteristics of Medellín’s development since the early 2000s. The 
introduction of neoliberal reforms in Colombia meant that traditional sources of income and 
power were increasingly phased out (i.e. with the abolishment of subsidised industrial 
credits). The resulting weakening of the traditional oligarchic industrial elite and the 
emergence of a political class with access to alternative sources of power (i.e. the illicit 
drug economy) led to political and economic instability. Nevertheless, during the 
implementation of structural adjustment reforms in the 1990s, the traditional elite could 
influence institutional mechanisms linked to the creation of new income opportunities (i.e. 
through privatisation and deregulation of specific sectors). Besides these changes in sources 
of power, the transition from an inward-oriented developmental model to a liberalised 
economic system also implied shifts in elite interests and capabilities towards a 
transnational logic of capital accumulation. 
Of power, institutions, and elites: the political settlements framework  
Political economy theories on why some countries are successful while others fail in 
achieving development largely emphasise the importance of power relations. Most 
prominently, Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) find that ‘nations fail’ due to unfavourable 
power balances that slow down or hinder the emergence of institutions that can protect 
private property rights and increase governance accountability. In most political economy 
discussions about the factors influencing the operation and the development outcomes of a 
political system, much attention is paid to the role of vested interests of elite factions in 
influencing institutional performance. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) argue that the 
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persistence of ‘wrong’ governance structures in less developed countries is a result of the 
ways in which powerful elites use political systems for the appropriation of rents that 
would disappear with ‘right’ institutional arrangements. Similarly, Kauffman et al. (1999), 
Krueger (1974), and Rodrik (1995) find that inefficient institutional regulations persist due 
to politically and economically powerful business groups and elites who use quotas, 
subsidies and tariffs to redistribute incomes to themselves. For this strand of literature, 
which originates from discussions in New Institutional Economics (NIE), the failure to 
achieve development is rooted in the failure to create and maintain stable, well-protected 
property rights, rule of law, and low corruption (Acemoglu et al., 2004; Acemoglu and 
Robinson, 2013; Kauffman et al., 1999; Krueger, 1974). The main argument is that 
powerful elites who are interested in the maximisation of their material gains obstruct 
growth-enhancing institutional changes.  
By contrast, the so-called political settlements framework, a critical political 
economy analytical approach pioneered by Khan (1995), argues that there are no ‘good’ or 
‘bad’ institutions, but only favourable and less favourable interdependent combinations of 
power balances and institutions. A political settlement is ‘a combination of power and 
institutions that is mutually compatible and also sustainable in terms of economic and 
political viability’ (Khan, 2010: 4). The political settlements framework is rooted in the 
idea that the historically evolved distribution of power interdependently shapes the 
institutional context in which policies are implemented in order to achieve development. 
Power is understood not only as economic capacities, but also includes considerations ‘how 
the relative power of organisations in that society affects the enforceability of different 
institutional rules’ (Khan, 2011: 1). This understanding of power includes the analysis of 
capacities of groups and classes to mobilise against imposed costs (i.e. through 
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demonstrations) and to absorb pain (Khan, 2009: 55). This notion of power facilitates the 
analysis of elites, powerful groups, and subordinate classes not solely according to their 
economic power, but also in terms of their political, organisational, and ideological 
capabilities.  
An important dimension in the political settlements theory is the source of power. A 
key research question is thus, how the political settlements have been – and continue to be 
– financed. The relative power of particular economic groups vis-à-vis the state is a crucial 
aspect of studying how power is achieved and maintained, as this relationship determines 
the type of institutions that distribute benefits in order to maintain predominant power 
balances (see Abdulai, 2017). Entrepreneurial capabilities and sectoral activities of the 
economic actors and elites as well as the ownership structure of their firms can give 
important insights into their (political) interests and bargaining games in a political 
settlement (Di John and Putzel, 2009). However, and since many capitalist and non-
capitalist firms often operate in multiple sectors, it is advisable to look at the historical 
evolvement of their capabilities and their relative organisational power in a political 
settlement (Pospisil and Rocha Menocal, 2017).  
Analysing the historically evolved relative power of economic groups and their 
capabilities in different sectors can give insights into elite influence on governance agencies 
(i.e. ruling coalition) in the distribution of benefits. This is true for the access to both, 
industrial financing instruments in pre-liberalisation contexts as well as benefits and 
priorities during liberalisation and privatisation reforms. For example, during import 
substitution industrialisation (ISI), elites in Latin America were able to influence 
institutional mechanisms that guaranteed access to benefits for their industrial activities (i.e. 
subsidised credits). This did not only help to achieve easy industrialisation, but also 
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consolidated power of the oligarchic elites in countries such as Colombia, Brazil, or Peru 
(see Khan and Blankenburg, 2009). 
Violence is another important source of power in a political settlement. Violence 
needs to be understood firstly as the act of establishing violence, often through the 
appropriation of assets and accumulation by dispossession (Harvey, 2003), as well as the 
fight over the consolidation of this monopoly (Giustozzi, 2011). The reoccurring 
phenomenon of military dictatorships in Latin America throughout the twentieth century 
and the continued prominence of primitive accumulation and (urban) land grabs underline 
the importance of violence as an important source of power (Biglaiser, 2002; Gómez et al., 
2015; Loveman, 1999; Steel et al., 2017). 
In most local contexts of the Global South today, power is often not fully aligned 
with the formal capitalist institutions and instead depends on informal institutional 
mechanisms (see Behuria et al., 2017). Firstly, this makes the mimicking of institutional 
policies of advanced capitalist settings difficult. Secondly, this means that changes in the 
distribution of power in local settings of less developed countries are not necessarily a 
result of changes in formal institutions, but rather in informal ones. Khan (2010: 10) 
defines informal institutions as ‘patterns of behaviour of individuals who are following 
internalised norms and values…(and) rules that are not formally written down…but which 
are nevertheless enforced by third parties’ such as patronage structures, mafias, or patron-
client networks. Illicit flows and accumulation patterns are thus a crucial aspect in the 
analysis of the distribution of power across a political settlement, particularly in Latin 
America (see Alonso et al., 2007; Ballvé, 2013; Romero and Valencia, 2007; Vargas, 2011; 
Watt and Zepeda, 2012). 
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Besides these factors that are internal to a particular society, exogenous factors that 
can influence the interdependent relationships between power and institutions and their 
indeterminate development outcomes need to be considered (see Hambleton, 2015; Rodrik, 
2014). This includes global economic and financial crises, shifts in international 
development paradigms and ideologies, current national policies, and capitalist 
transnationalisation. 
The analysis of exogenous factors is particularly relevant for the study of Latin 
American societies, where external debt has generally been very high. For example, 
paradigm shifts in international development organisations have played a crucial role in 
shaping elite interests and policy choices of political actors in Latin America are (see 
Glassman and Carmody, 2001). This is particularly true for the shift towards the so-called 
‘Washington Consensus’, where Williamson (1990) argued that Latin America’s policy 
makers should inter alia introduce reforms packages to privatise state-owned enterprises, to 
introduce fiscal policy discipline, and to liberalise fiscal and currant accounts. Furthermore, 
the recommendations of the ‘post-Washington Consensus’ (see Stiglitz, 1998) particularly 
targeted Latin American countries where the market-based policies had failed to achieve 
considerable levels of economic development.  
Furthermore, recent developments in local settings of less developed countries need 
to be understood in the context of broader shifts in capitalist development. The global 
economic integration of Latin America’s economies implied the transnationalisation of 
local capitalist assets and elite interests. Latin America’s local contingents of transnational 
capitalists have consolidated their economic power by developing capacities as political 
actors through ‘(establishing) new institutional bases from which to develop programs and 
assemble teams, largely constituted by new private sector associations and elite 
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foundations’ (Robinson, 2010: 173). This also included ‘a shift in subsidies that states 
provide, away from social reproduction and from internal economic agents and towards 
transnational capital’ (Robinson, 2010: 33).  While the transnational capitalist elite in local 
contexts of Latin American societies might be qualitatively different from the well-paid 
junior partners of imperialist capital, it has many of its origins in the old-style comprador 
class (see Reyes, 2003).  
Hambleton (2015) also finds that powerful globalised actors shape the context in 
which place-based local policies are introduced and enforced. However, the author argues 
that ‘cities and localities are not helpless victims in a global flow of events’ (Hambleton, 
2015: 172). The task for local governance actors and institutions is to manage the external 
pressures in ways that bring positive outcomes for the local population. The local 
contingents of Latin America’s transnationalised capitalists, for example, play a key role in 
the internalisation of external dynamics and interests and need to be understood as such. A 
key challenge for scholars researching local governance in globalised contexts is thus to 
identify external powerful forces as well as local ‘place-based’ actors that negotiate with 
globalised organisations, internalise and indigenise external interests, and implement and 
enforce local economic policies. 
With these theoretical considerations in mind, the next sections discuss the 
development of Colombia’s second city Medellín. The detailed analysis of historically 
evolved power balances, external influences, and interests of local actors provides in-depth 
explanations of recent economic changes in Medellín that go beyond the dominant 
‘miracle’ arguments. 
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The historical evolution of power, institutions and elite interests in Medellín  
The main variable of the political settlements approach is the historically evolved 
distribution of power in a particular society. As such, the study of Medellín’s development 
requires an analysis of the power balances that shape the local context. While historically, 
Medellín’s society had been characterised by a strong hegemony of oligarchic economic 
elites with entrepreneurial capabilities in labour-intensive industrial sectors, such as 
textiles, this changed during the course of the 1980s and 1990s.  
With Colombia’s industrial decline in the late-1970s, Medellín’s elite and the entire 
urban economy ‘stood at the advent of an irreversible crisis in the productive sector, which 
witnessed the beginning of the decline of hegemony and the reorganisation of the industrial 
elite (in Medellín)’ (Franco Restrepo, 2005: 154). The deindustrialisation started with the 
crisis of the textile industry (Escobar and Hoyos, 1986) and symbolised a decrease in the 
elite’s access to traditional sources of their power in form of state-created industrial 
benefits (i.e. tariffs and subsidies for light manufacturing industries). 
With these changes, the dominant economic elite was challenged by the rise of ‘a 
new elite, a political class, which was formed around a regional bureaucratic apparatus’ 
(Dover and Ocampo, 2006: 263–264). Professional politicians, who articulated their 
interests independently from the traditional elites, started a process of reorganisation of 
power relations (Duque Daza, 2007). Duncan (2005) and Palacios (2001) find the rise of 
the political emerging class (‘clase emergente’) a logical consequence of a crisis of the ISI 
development model which had been the main source of power for the traditional economic 
elites leading to ‘a fragmentation of the elite – in singular – into different groups of power’ 
(Leyva, 2014: 126). Many observers consider this the breaking point between the political 
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and economic elites in Medellín (see Dover and Ocampo, 2006; Franco Restrepo, 2005; 
Restrepo Santamaría, 2011). 
The rise of the ‘emergentes’ also meant an increasing competition over economic 
influence in order to secure access to sources of power (Franco Restrepo, 2005: 355). For 
example, the ‘emergentes’ developed links with actors of the illicit drug industry, namely 
Pablo Escobar and his Medellín Cartel and paramilitary groups, which are well documented 
elsewhere1 (see Carvajal, 2011; Duncan, 2013; Martin, 2014; Romero and Valencia, 2007; 
Salazar, 1990, 2012; Thoumi, 1995). Moreover, the emerging political class also developed 
capabilities in sectors that had been traditionally in the sphere of influence of the oligarchic 
economic elite (see Franco Restrepo, 2005; Leyva, 2014; Restrepo Santamaría, 2011). As a 
response to this threat from outsiders of the dominant elite bargain and a continued decline 
of industrial incomes that resulted in hostile takeovers of some of Medellín’s flagship 
companies by rival elite factions (see Londoño, 2004; Restrepo Santamaría, 2011), 
Medellín’s traditional elites formed the so-called Sindicato Antioqueño also known as 
Grupo Empresarial Antioqueño (Entrepreneurial Group of Antioquia, GEA)2.  
Various other factors in the 1990s such as far-reaching liberalisation, drastic 
privatisation, extensive deregulation and decentralisation3 reforms, as well as economic and 
financial crises changed the context in which the different elite factions tried to (formally 
and informally) influence the institutional landscape in order to secure access to sources of 
power. This also influenced the interests of the different elite factions.  
From a closed to a liberalised economy: power, institutions, and elites in Medellín 
The decrease of internal demand caused by the crises of Colombia’s inward-oriented 
developmental model, and the decline in foreign demand caused by the massive 1980s debt 
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crises of many Latin American countries had detrimental effects on Colombia’s current 
account. Following the large increase in deficit during the 1980s, Colombia ‘started a 
process of structural adjustment, which did not only include an orthodox macroeconomic 
program, overlooked by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), but also an interference of 
the World Bank, particularly in sectoral politics’ (Ocampo, 1986: 230). This intervention of 
international organizations not only led to the reversal of many of Colombia’s protectionist 
measures (see López Restrepo, 1995), but has also substantially limited policy control of 
local and national governance agencies. 
The 1991 Colombian Constitution completely liberalised the country’s current and 
capital accounts (Ocampo, 2007). Better known today as ‘apertura’ (opening), this also 
entailed a sweeping privatisation of public assets and services, extensive deregulation of 
state control over productive sectors, the introduction of a new foreign investment regime, 
the flexibilisation of labour markets, and a drastic devaluation of the Colombian Peso 
(Garay, 1998). The idea behind the restructuring efforts was to minimise the role of the 
state and its capacity to intervene in economic policy in order to secure and guarantee free 
market competition (see Constitución Política de Colombia, 1991, articles 333 and 334).  
For Medellín’s elites, this meant that access to traditional sources of state-created 
industrial rents diminished (i.e. through subsidised credits), changing the formal and 
informal activities regarding elite access to new sources of power. During the 
implementation of the ‘apertura’ reforms powerful business groups, inter alia the GEA, 
could influence institutional mechanisms linked to the creation of new income 
opportunities (i.e. through privatisation and deregulation of specific sectors). Business 
groups with traditionally large organisational power, such as the GEA became ‘the most 
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consistent beneficiaries of some of the reforms’ central programs, especially privatisation’ 
(Rettberg, 2005: 33).  
As traditional accumulation strategies were no longer viable, Medellín’s economic 
elite focused on developing entrepreneurial and technological capabilities in sectors that 
were believed to have comparative advantages in global value creation (see Fernández 
Jilberto and Hogenboom, 2004: 154). The GEA used the neoliberal turn of Colombia to 
deepen capital concentration in the sectors of finance, services, construction, and food 
processing. 
In interviews with several CEOs of GEA companies, it was repeatedly stressed that 
in order to be competitive in the global markets the GEA needed to concentrate on 
economic activities in sectors where Medellín has comparative advantages over other cities 
with similar factor endowments. Ricardo Sierra, longstanding CEO of the GEA confirmed 
that ‘with the ‘apertura’ all of the companies started to have different problems… than in 
the closed economy of the 1970s’ (Sierra, 2014). The current CEO of the GEA’s largest 
insurance company Sura emphasised that in the liberalised companies ‘needed to disinvest 
in traditional businesses to be able to invest in finance, cement, and light manufacturing 
because we knew we had to go out and compete not only in Colombia but also outside’ 
(Bojanini, 2014). José Alberto Vélez, CEO of Argos, Colombia’s largest construction 
material producer, confirmed this: ‘we had to diversify geographically and each company 
should concentrate on a single sector… With this strategy we gained increased capacity to 
indebt our companies4‘ (Vélez, 2014).  
This increased capacity to raise external funding also stems from a change in the 
organisation of the GEA in Colombia’s financially liberalised economy. Holding 
companies were formed in order to secure access to new financial resources through 
13 
 
increased participation in international credit markets. The rationale for this concentration 
on financial activities is the fact that financial intermediation ‘does not require high levels 
of capital investment but generates capital gains’ (Sierra, 2014). Ricardo Sierra further 
stressed that ‘the GEA’s companies redefine their businesses within (the context of) 
globalisation; and with globalisation they needed to become Multilatinas,’ (Sierra, 2014). 
The transition towards a transnational capitalist elite reflects a broader trend of elites in less 
developing countries aiming at the promotion of the advancement of financialised global 
capitalism (see Reyes, 2003; Robinson, 2010). Globalised financial circuits have dictated 
the strategy of the GEA since the ‘apertura’ reforms, making activities linked to sectors 
such as finance, real estate, tourism, and construction the primary sources of profit and 
power. 
Besides these changes in sources of power linked to shifts from an inward-oriented 
developmental model towards a neoliberal logic of transnational capital accumulation 
(which also implied changes on the organisational structures of Medellín’s businesses), 
there remain some local government incomes that need to be considered in the analysis of 
the different sources of power and elite interests. The next subsection discusses how the 
local public utility provider EPM is an important factor in the analysis of sources of power 
in Medellín’s political settlement following the ‘apertura’ reforms. 
Empresas Públicas de Medellín (EPM), elite disputes, and power balances 
Despite that EPM is governed by private law (known as ‘privatismo organizacional’ see 
Varela Barrios, 2011, 2010), ownership of the company remains fully public. EPM 
continues to transfer 30% of its dividends to the municipal budget, making the company an 
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important mechanism for the creation of additional income (Botero and Villegas, 2005; 
López, 2005).  
While the access to public incomes through EPM had always been attractive for 
local elite factions, the control of EPM became a particular interest following the ‘apertura’ 
and several reform changes allowing EPM to access the international credit market, debt 
finance its operations, and create for-profit joint venture companies in other regions (see 
Furlong, 2015). This provided opportunities for public administrations to circumvent 
constitutional limitations on debt finance for municipalities (Cabrera and Naranjo, 2003), 
making EPM an important source of incomes through increased transfers to the 
municipality budget (see figure 1 and figure 2) and contracting for infrastructural projects. 
Drawing on urban entrepreneurialism literature, Furlong (2015: 202) argues that the 
increase in the company’s capacity to transfer additional income to the municipality’s 
budget is an indicator that in Medellín ‘capitalist production is enmeshed with public 
dividends and social reproduction’. The capacity of EPM to create large amounts of 
additional incomes has made the public utility company an important source of power. 
According to Dover and Ocampo (2006: 286) EPM has become ‘politically attractive, due 
to its symbolic capital… as well as due to its transferred financial resources to the Mayor’s 
office’. 
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FIGURE 1: TRANSFERS FROM EPM TO THE MUNICIPAL BUDGET IN CURRENT COP 
SOURCES: BONILLA ET AL. (2013); BONILLA AND AMADO (2013); CARRANZA AND BONILLA 
(2013) 
 
 
FIGURE 2: ACCUMULATED DEBT OF EPM IN CURRENT COP 
SOURCES: BONILLA ET AL. (2013); BONILLA AND AMADO (2013); CARRANZA AND BONILLA 
(2013) 
 
 
The victory of Luis Pérez Gutiérrez in the 2000 mayoral elections marks an important point 
in the history of Medellín’s elites and their dispute over access to sources of power. Pérez 
Gutiérrez is one of the leading representatives of the political class of ‘emergentes’. 
Following his election, the competition over access to EPM’s profits became a source of 
tensions between the economic elite of the GEA and the political class of ‘emergentes’. 
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Self-declared as ‘the real representative of the people’ who was against the 
‘exclusionary tradition of the economic elites’, Mayor Pérez Gutiérrez adopted a 
confrontational discourse towards the economic elites of the GEA (see Dover and Ocampo, 
2006: 268–270). In his first year in office, Mayor Pérez Gutiérrez declared that ‘EPM 
controls most business in Colombia… The GEA is pennyworth compared… and this is 
what makes it attractive for the people of the GEA who want to take over EPM’ (Dover and 
Ocampo, 2006: 254).  
Policies causing conflict between the different elite factions were inter alia the 
expansion of EPM into sectors beyond gas, water and electricity (also into GEA-controlled 
sectors) as well as the introduction of so-called ‘tarifas justas’, fair tariffs that aimed to 
freeze energy and water prices (Pérez Gutiérrez, 2003). Members of the economic elite saw 
this as a frontal attack on their interests. Dover and Ocampo (2006: 286) conclude the elite 
disputes over EPM that caused political fragility are ‘consequences from the way Pérez 
Gutiérrez rejected the economic leadership of the city and favoured the political 
management of the company’. The marginalisation of the GEA in the ruling coalition and 
the exclusion from access to local government incomes destabilised the polity at the turn of 
the millennium (Franco Restrepo, 2005: 29). Relationships between the GEA and Pérez 
Gutiérrez remain sour to this day, demonstrated by Ricardo Sierra’s (the longstanding CEO 
of the GEA) view on this: ‘I hate Luis Pérez, because we know that he is a rat and that he is 
a thief’ (Sierra, 2014). 
Based on interviews with members of the political and the economic elites, 
Betancur et al. (2001) confirm this divide between the two elite factions after the turn of the 
millennium. Thus, despite the GEA representatives stressing that ‘we need to work together 
to help each other’, the interviews show growing gaps between the factions. One CEO of a 
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GEA company mentions that ‘the political class is considered as corrupt’ and ‘the 
economic class is more representative of the region’. The economic elite saw itself to be 
‘on a different side’, as it supposedly ‘integrates more social sectors of society’ than the 
political elite (Betancur et al., 2001: 236). 
This idea that the political elite was inherently corrupt and an obstacle to 
development is not only central in considerations regarding the divide between different 
powerful elite factions and the destabilisation of the political settlement in Medellín. It also 
serves as theoretical advocacy for neoliberal governance policies more generally (see Khan, 
2012). Furthermore, the rhetoric used by the GEA representative shows that the GEA was 
mobilising to more actively take control over organisational and distributional powers in 
Medellín. Betancur et al. (2001: 151) rightly conclude that the shift in the GEA’s strategy 
‘could be hinting at an interest of the Grupo for more direct involvement in policy decisions 
in the region’. The next section discusses how the GEA developed capacities of direct 
political involvement, using a comparative advantage and corruption discourse reflected in 
proposals of a new governance model for Medellín. 
The Medellín model of governance and the role of the GEA  
As discussed, the descendants of the historically dominant elite factions, now represented 
by the transnational capitalists of the GEA, were increasingly excluded from access to 
sources of power in form of benefits and transfers from EPM. Consequently, and 
confronted with changing power structures in a political settlement marked by high 
competition between different elites, low economic growth, and political instability, the 
GEA became increasingly interested in establishing a more direct influence in the local 
political sphere (see Dover and Ocampo, 2006: 256). The economic elite, according to 
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GEA affiliate Sergio Fajardo hence ‘realised that politicians are the ones who make 
important decisions in society whether we like it or not, so we said to ourselves that we 
have to get into politics. Instead of saying how things should be, we said this is the way it is 
done’ (Fajardo cited in Fukuyama and Colby, 2011). 
The Medellín Chamber of Commerce has been an important arena for the GEA’s 
development of political capacities vis-à-vis the political class of ‘emergentes’. Throughout 
the 1990s, the GEA used the Chamber as an indirect forum of influence to express concerns 
about the need for policies to facilitate Medellín’s insertion into global value and 
production chains. In its 1995 ‘Reporte Monitor’ the Chamber proposed ‘strategies such as 
the change of the productive profile of the region from its traditional industrial setting 
towards promoting financial, touristic, and medical services’ (Betancur et al., 2001: 138; 
Cámera de Comercio, 1995). The 1999 ‘Plan Estratégico’ advocated further local economic 
reforms and promoted the development of sectors that were seen as most likely to compete 
globally with other similarly endowed cities and stressed that a new form of politics was 
required that departed from the ‘clase emergente’ and its ‘political-clientelist’ way of 
governance (Cámera de Comercio, 1999).  
Hence, with the political understanding that a minimally interventionist state and the 
conviction that focusing on global comparative advantages achieves optimal outcomes the 
GEA mobilised to influence Medellín’s Mayoral race in 2003. While in the 1990s the GEA 
had tentatively begun to develop political capacities to influence municipal political 
decision making, it was Sergio Fajardo’s Compromiso Ciudadano (Citizens’ Commitment)5 
and the GEA’s strong position in this coalition that cemented the leading role of Medellín’s 
transnational capitalist elite in the local political arena. Fajardo, former director of the GEA 
think-tank ProAntioquia and member of a leading ‘GEA family’ investing in the 
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construction sector had helped this new political movement to emerge amidst the political 
and economic reorganisation of the GEA during the years of the Pérez Gutiérrez 
administration.  
Once in power, the Fajardo coalition implemented an ambitious reform agenda. 
Their 2004-2007 Development Plan emphasised the need for a reform of public institutions 
to achieve ‘transparency and good governance’ (Alcaldía de Medellín, 2004: 41), focusing 
on ‘fighting corruption and politicking… to achieve confidence… through transparency and 
institutional developments… that attract and congregates investments and economic 
activities (for development)’ (Alcaldía de Medellín, 2004: 15; 99). The agenda was based 
on the idea that efficient public management needs as little state intervention as possible to 
avoid any market distortions and restrictions on private capital movements (see Ramírez 
Brouchoud, 2012). 
Another key factor that shaped the governance structure of the Fajardo coalition was 
the large presence of GEA actors in the cabinet itself as well as in many public-private 
partnerships created during the first months of the Fajardo government. Fajardo’s Private 
Secretary and campaign manager David Escobar Arango mentioned, ‘the interesting part of 
our governance formula is the public-private spirit. We created new public-private 
partnerships organisations and institutions after I took office’ (Escobar Arango, 2014).  
Various public-private alliances dominate much of Medellín’s new governance 
framework. A prime example of the increased presence of public-private partnerships in the 
Fajardo government is the Agencia para la Cooperación Internacional de Medellín (Agency 
for Cooperation and Investment of Medellín, ACI), which serves to promote Medellín as an 
attractive destination for Foreign Direct Investments (FDI). According to its former 
director, Juan David Valderrama, the ACI acts as official organisation ‘in all public policy 
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areas concerned with social and economic issues. … We want to incentivise and motivate 
foreign companies to invest in sectors… that focus on services’ (Valderrama, 2014). 
The increased influence of private interests in the management of public policy 
areas is also well reflected in the interviews with CEOs of GEA companies. The current 
head of the GEA and president of its largest company Sura mentioned the increased power 
of the GEA:  
‘the beauty of this created institutionality has been that the government has invited 
the private actors so we can help in the public management. We are in governing 
boards, and we hold patronage in many institutions… But if in the future a Mayor 
will be elected who is against all this, we will put great pressure on him through all 
the institutions that the city has, first so he won’t steal money, and conducts 
transparent public management, and then apply all the regulatory measures we have 
set up’ (Bojanini, 2014).  
José Alberto Vélez, CEO of Argos added: ‘the boards of directors (of public institutions) 
are very much dominated by the GEA. This makes it possible to keep political partisan 
clientelism out’ (Vélez, 2014). The vice-president of GEA’s Bancolombia also stressed 
that:  
‘the creation of public-private alliances and other public institutional penetration 
from the private sector have secured the continuity of our interests regardless who 
will come to power… The GEA can act within the margins of the law… and we 
have been concerned with supporting who we think would govern best… We will 
not accept a Mayor that de-links us from our political interests again’ (Pérez 
Moreno, 2014). 
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By acquiring detailed legislative and executive capacities, the GEA has great influence on 
the creation and enforcement of institutional mechanisms and thus sources of additional 
income and power. While public-private partnerships can be of high importance for 
productive economic transformation if they build linkages to the wider economy (Jessop 
and Sum, 2000: 2293), the success in achieving sustainable and inclusive developmental 
outcomes depends on the wider politico-economic environment, and on the power balances 
between different actors of a political settlement. And as some academic observers have 
pointed out, the particularity of Medellín’s political economy has resulted in a shift away 
from direct intervention of government and state power towards a governance framework 
that facilitates market-driven management of the local economy (Brand, 2013; Franz, 2017; 
Hylton, 2007).  
Analysing the second 2008-2011 Development Plan of the Fajardo coalition shows 
that the policies proposed largely focused on strengthening economic sectors with low 
technological and low productivity potentials (Alcaldía de Medellín, 2008). For example, 
the ‘Medellín Ciudad Cluster’ program is aimed at the low productivity sectors of 
Medellín’s economy ‘in order to achieve a better insertion into global dynamics’ (Alcaldía 
de Medellín, 2008: 119). This cluster program focuses on Medellín’s ‘local-level 
competition with other cities and regions for the deployment of economic activities to have 
the capacity to act in a context of increasing globalisation, creating locational advantages to 
increase the business climate’ (Alcaldía de Medellín, 2008: 82).  
Medellín’s governance agenda fully embraces wider economic ideas and ideals 
according to which economic growth is based on the city’s global comparative advantages 
in service sectors, finance, tourism, and construction. In an interview, Fajardo’s successor 
as Mayor and his close ally Alonso Salazar stressed that ‘Medellín is no longer an industrial 
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city and is developing as a city of services’ (Salazar, 2014). Iván Mauricio Pérez Salazar, 
former Secretary of Finance, reaffirms that ‘services are, without a doubt, Medellín’s 
vocation. We have very strong and competitive service sectors, such as retail, hotels, 
finance, which for me are the drivers of Medellín’s economy’ (Pérez Salazar, 2014). 
Fajardo’s Private Secretary and campaign manager highlighted that: 
‘for Medellín there is no other way (to develop) than through services and this 
becomes more evident when you look at what is happening in other cities… It is not 
that we don’t want diversification… but I believe what Ricardo Hausmann says is 
true: ‘Rich countries produce rich-country goods’. It sounds silly, but it is true. Here 
(in Medellín), there will be no exports in steel or cars’ (Escobar Arango, 2014).  
The governance model is hence a result of the embeddedness of neoliberal ideology into the 
urban context of Medellín (see Brenner and Theodore, 2002; Franz, 2017). A manual by the 
discussed public-private organisation ACI that aims to attract FDI to the city’s economy 
indicates this rather well: 
‘The minimum wage in Colombia is one of the lowest in Latin America… 
Colombia has one of the most flexible labour regimes in Latin America… A day 
shift [in Medellín] is long, from 6am to 10pm, and the employer can sign on two 
shifts without overtime pay or night surcharges; in the recruitment and employment 
of apprentices… the employer has no obligation to pay social benefits,… and the 
amount of compensation for unreasonable dismissal is very low (ACI et al., 2006: 
65-66 cited in Betancur, 2008: 1).  
A statement by Fajardo’s Secretary of Social Development also reflects this: ‘To strengthen 
the service sectors the city was given the task of selling itself abroad as a competitive, 
innovative, affordable city for foreign investment’ (Mejía Martínez, 2014).  
23 
 
 The implementation of Fajardo’s governance model is thus an institutional 
mechanism for market-driven development. The GEA, who prior to economic liberalisation 
had failed to develop economic capabilities in technologically advanced sectors and 
concentrated on investments in services following the ‘apertura’ reforms, gained 
considerable organisational power following the 2003 municipal elections. Medellín’s 
transnationalising capitalist elite adopted the neoliberal governance discourse of 
comparative advantages and corruption as an opportunity to restore and deepen power 
through securing access to transnational capital as well as sources of locally created 
benefits by EPM.  
The particular distribution of power in Medellín’s political settlement, where 
transnational capitalist elites with capabilities in firms with minimal technological 
inventory have considerable power, has resulted in the establishment of institutional 
mechanisms that enhance conditions in which governance reforms and policy strategies are 
inherently targeting sectors that are unlikely to be sustainable and inclusive development 
escalators in the long run. The focus on sectors with perceived global comparative 
advantages can lead to a failure of attracting FDI that can have positive forward and 
backward linkages for local medium or high technology sectors and local firms. The extent 
to which this strategy has driven the development of economic activities will be 
quantitatively analysed in the following section. 
Empirical evaluation  
The political settlements literature argues that developmental outcomes are a reflection of 
the way in which the distribution of power in a particular setting shapes institutional 
functions to minimise transaction costs and to distribute benefits according to the 
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predominant power balances. The relative power, the capabilities, and the interests of 
economic groups in this context further influence institutional capacities.  
The preceding sections found that the distribution of power in Medellín has led to 
the establishment of institutional mechanisms that reflect the interests of the GEA. As such, 
the quantitative evaluation of Medellín’s development outcomes are not presented as 
isolated results detached from local, context-specific politics. Rather, the capabilities of the 
GEA and the local governance agenda implemented since 2003 have resulted in the 
creation and enforcement of institutional mechanisms that drive economic development 
outcomes and help in maintaining the predominant distribution of power stable. 
Between 2004 and 2012 Medellín’s economy grew rapidly, considerably above the 
average growth rate of Colombia. Some academic observers, NGOs, public officials and 
business actors in Medellín see this this increased economic dynamic as a result of the 2004 
implemented governance agenda, underpinning the ‘metropolitan miracle’ (see Cámera de 
Comercio, 2011). Hence, the aggregated growth data of Medellín shows that the 
institutional changes might have had positive developmental outcomes. 
However, a closer look at the disaggregated data reveals that the composition of 
political, institutional and economic factors in Medellín’s political settlement has 
incentivised economic growth driven by a large expansion of activities in sectors that are 
marked by low productivity (figures 3 and 4). While the value-added share of 
manufacturing industries has consistently decreased since 2005, the financial sector as well 
as hospitality services (tourism) and construction increased by large margins (figure 3). In 
fact, in 2014 these three economic sectors were responsible for over 50% of value added 
and GDP growth (figure 4). The focus on developing a tourist industry is compatible with 
broader global economic transformation patterns elsewhere in Latin America (Robinson, 
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2010). However, tourism depends on highly price- and income-elastic and unstable 
demand. In Medellín, despite authorities seeking ‘to sell the city’ in a very aggressive 
manner, as a host locality the local government has very little control over this demand and 
thus over possible labour market impacts.  
The gap between manufacturing and non-manufacturing growth of GDP is 
widening. With valued-added growth of over 53% between 2005 and 2014 the non-
manufacturing sectors have become the leading drivers of economic growth. While the 
manufacturing sector has experienced some growth, the sector has become increasingly 
marginalised as it now only contributes 11% to GDP growth (figure 4).  
 
FIGURE 3: VALUE ADDED BY ECONOMIC SECTORS, 2005 AND 2014 
SOURCES: CAMARA DE COMERCIO (2015), WITH DATA FROM DANE (2017) 
 
 
FIGURE 4: CONTRIBUTION TO GDP GROWTH BY ECONOMIC SECTOR, 2014 
SOURCES: CAMARA DE COMERCIO (2015), WITH DATA FROM DANE (2017) 
22%
14%
17%
15%
8%
7%
8%
6%3%
24%
15%
15%
15%
8%
8%
7%
6% 2%
Financial intermediation, real
estate, etc.
Trade, Commerce, hotels,
restaurants, etc.
Manufacturing Industries
Social, public, and private
services
Construction
Transport and communication
Agriculture, forestry and
fishing
Electricity, gas and water
2014
2005
23%
17%
16%
11%
11%
9%
5%
4% 4%
Financial intermediation,
real estate, etc.
Construction
Commerce, hotels,
restaurants, etc.
Social, public, and private
services
Manufacturing Industries
Transport and
communication
Agriculture, forestry and
fishing
26 
 
Following Porter (2003) and Ramírez et al. (2014), who argue that regional productivity 
potential is determined by the presence of traded industries as well as the relative 
productivity of these industries, employment concentration and productivity growth of non-
agricultural firms based in Medellín are analysed. The data are from different years of the 
Encuesta Anual Manufacturera (Annual Manufacturing Survey, EAM) as well as the 
Planilla Integrada de Liquidación de Aportes para Seguridad Social (Integrated Liquidation 
Accounts for Social Security, PILA)6. 
More specifically, two factors that determine the entrepreneurial capacities of firms 
in Medellín to achieve growth high productivity sectors are studied. Firstly, Employment 
Concentration Factor (ECF) is calculated, which provides insight into the concentration of 
employment in each sector in Medellín relative to similar activities in other parts of the 
country. ECF shows the relation of local employment in a specific sector in Medellín (esM) 
with the total employment of Medellín (eM), divided by the relationship between national 
employment in that sector (EsT) and total employment nationally (ET). 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = �𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 �(𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠 )  
An ECFsM>1 means that a specific industry is concentrated in Medellín, relative to the rest 
of the country. Following the rationale of Porter (2003) and Ramírez et al. (2014), the 
relative employment concentration of a local sector can indicate the traded capacities of 
that sector. An ECFsM = 1 or <1 shows that economic activities of the analyzed sector are 
geared towards local market needs and can be described as ‘local sectors’ (see Ramírez et 
al., 2014).  
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The second variable for the analysis of Medellín’s non-agricultural firms is the 
Labour Productivity Factor (LPF), which serves as a proxy for Medellín’s productivity 
performance. The model proposed by Ramírez et al. (2014: 25) can help determining this 
proxy for relative productivity of local and tradable industries. This model estimates the 
LPF variable by comparing the salaries of workers in a particular sector of Medellín’s 
industry with the average salary that is paid across Medellín’s economy (LPF1). With the 
assumption that workers that have higher skills in higher productivity sectors are better 
remunerated than low-skilled workers in sectors with lower productivity, this variable can 
help in determining relative regional productivity of a particular sector7.  
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸1 =  𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠  
 
Depending on data availability, LPF is calculated comparing the salaries of a particular 
industrial sector in Medellín with the average salary paid in that sector nationally (LPF2).  
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸2 =  𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠  
Due to limited availability of data on salaries in the EAM data, LPF calculations show the 
relationship between value added per worker in a particular industrial sector of Medellín 
with value added per worker in the entire local economy (LPF3). Or value added per worker 
in a specific local industry over value added per worker in that industry on the national 
level (LPF4).  
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸3 =  𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠  
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸4 =  𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠  
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The findings for Medellín show that there is a large absence of tradable and high 
productivity economic activities. The only tradable sector that shows high productivity 
potential and concentrates more than 10,000 employees is Medellín’s financial sector. This 
underlines the trend of the finance-driven and possibly speculative development of the 
city’s economy. The PILA data also reveals that the tradable industries of textile, metal and 
plastic show low productivity capabilities in relation to other economic activities, while at 
the same time these sectors concentrate a large proportion of local employment (see figure 
5). The relatively high productivity of the electricity, gas and water sector can be explained 
by the presence of EPM and its role as one of Colombia’s largest utility providers. 
However, most economic activities are concentrated in the low LPF and low ECF quadrant 
(see figure 5). The low productivity and the lack of trading capacities of these sectors 
clearly indicates that economic growth in Medellín over the past decade or so is largely 
built on weak foundations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 5: EMPLOYMENT CONCENTRATION AND PRODUCTIVITY OF SECTORS IN MEDELLÍN 
SOURCE: RAMÍREZ ET AL. (2014), WITH DATA FROM PILA 
 
29 
 
Medellín’s industry is dominated by labour-intensive manufacturing of non-durable goods, 
such as textile and furniture (see figure 6). Most employment is concentrated in these 
sectors, where ECF is relatively high. However, these sectors have low productivity 
capabilities. This becomes visible in figure 6, where the low productivity of these sectors is 
measured by the generation of value added per worker in comparison to general economic 
activities in industrial sectors of Medellín’s economy. The only non-agricultural sector that 
shows high productivity capabilities is the beverage industry, which at the same time seems 
to be concentrated on local markets. The inward relationship between ECF and LPF 
depicted in figure 6 clearly shows that sectors marked by high productivity in Medellín are 
limited to the local economy and do not concentrate large parts of the labour force. 
 
 
FIGURE 6: EMPLOYMENT CONCENTRATION AND PRODUCTIVITY: MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY 
SOURCE: DATA FROM EAM8, OWN CALCULATION 
 
The trend of Medellín’s low productivity growth is also reflected in urban labour market 
developments. In figure 7, negative or at least questionable trends of Medellín’s labour 
market become visible. Compared to the rest of the country, the overall number of 
established companies increased, while value added and gross production of Medellín’s 
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economy decreased. Figure 7 furthermore shows that the increase in employment was 
largely absorbed by an increase in temporal employees, while real wages (income) and 
permanent employment stagnated or even decreased. The increase of temporal employees is 
also an indicator of the continued prominence of informal employment in Medellín, which 
often reinforces tendencies of low wage and flexible formal labour market. It is thus 
unsurprising that Medellín has on of the lowest GDP per capita in Latin America (see 
Brookings, 2015). 
 
 
FIGURE 7: RELATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF MEDELLÍN’S LABOUR MARKET VARIABLES 
SOURCE: DANE (2017), OWN CALCULATIONS  
 
To gain further insights into the characteristics and productivity capacities of Medellín’s 
economy, a closer look at the relationship between the local gross employment elasticities 
and the development of labour productivity is advisable. Gross employment elasticity is 
defined as the ratio between employment growth and GDP growth. The degree of 
employment elasticity of a country (or in this case a city) is indicative of the degree of 
flexibility of the national (or local) labour market. A higher elasticity indicates a higher 
degree of labour market flexibility.  
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General trends in Latin America show that employment elasticities are much higher 
than in the rest of the world (Palma, (2011). The labour market of Colombia in general and 
Medellín in particular is not an exception to this. Quite the contrary: Cano and Ochoa 
(2008) as well as Vélez Cardona (2001) find that Medellín has very high gross employment 
elasticities resulting from the relatively high sensitivity of Medellín’s employment to output 
growth. The particularities of Medellín’s labour market, characterised by its structurally 
low productivity and high gross employment elasticities, often limit the amount of 
productivity growth and high-wage employment that can be generated with additional GDP 
growth. The highly flexible labour market regime in Medellín – reinforced through low-
wage policies and the continued prominence of informal employment – undermines 
potential productivity growth in periods of high economic dynamism. In such periods, 
additional growth is absorbed by an increase in employment.  
Overall, these trends explain why much of the formal sector of Medellín’s economy 
remains in such activities that require low technology and low-skilled labour. Palma’s (2011: 
29) conclusion for Latin America aligns closely with the findings for Medellín: ‘In other 
words, this bulk of the economy can operate with few compulsions for productivity growth 
thanks to ‘flexible’ labour markets,… and a (typically) high degree of oligopolistic 
concentration’. The modern sector of Medellín is thus based on low productivity 
manufacturing of non-durable commodities, a low technology service sector that has low 
productivity growth rates, and the abundance of cheap (informal) labour supply. It is 
therefore not surprising that Medellín remains the most unequal city in one of the most 
unequal countries worldwide (see figure 8). 
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FIGURE 8: INEQUALITY IN MAJOR COLOMBIAN CITIES, GINI LEVELS FOR 2010 
SOURCE: DANE (2017), OWN ELABORATION  
 
The implementation of a particular brand of governance reforms in Medellín that have 
largely incorporated neoliberal ideas has not only hindered the creation of opportunities for 
high productivity growth, but has also crippled possibilities of creating market compulsions 
in which these opportunities can be taken up. Furthermore, the very particularity of 
Medellín’s economy is that it has served as a very effective tool for the transnationalised 
capitalist elite to perpetuate structural tendencies of unequal distributional outcomes in the 
city’s society. The hegemonic nature of the organisational power of actors that promote 
market-driven development makes it close to impossible actors external to the current 
ruling coalition to challenge this strategy.  
Conclusion  
This article has argued that the distribution of power in Medellín and the evolving elite 
interests have shaped governance structures in ways which not only provide the economic 
elite of the GEA access to sources of power (i.e. transnational capital and EPM profits) that 
help in sustaining power balances, but also contribute to low productivity development 
outcomes. The local governance reforms implemented in Medellín since 2003 need to be 
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understood as opportunistic institutional mechanisms to deepen powers of a 
transnationalised capitalist elite, adopted in the larger neoliberal context of Colombia’s 
polity.  
The analysis of qualitative and quantitative empirical data showed how the 
establishment of institutional mechanisms enhanced conditions in which policy strategies 
are targeting low productivity sectors with perceived comparative advantages in 
transnational capitalist chains of value creation. Medellín’s governance agenda has 
achieved neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for generating positive forward and 
backward linkages for productivity growth of local firms as they effectively contributed to 
the expansion of service-based accumulation.  
These developmental outcomes underline Medellín’s return to static comparative 
advantages in labour-intensive industries and low technology services. Medellín’s 
governance model does not challenge but rather perpetuates the city’s productivity and 
inequality problems.  
Unless structural reforms targeting low wages, tackling informality and 
incentivising firms to become competitive through the development of technological 
capabilities are implemented, these tendencies are likely to persist. Future contributions to 
the discussion on Medellín’s development need to focuses on specific policy alternatives to 
raise local productivity levels. This could provide national and local governance agencies 
with important insights on how to achieve more inclusive and sustainable productivity 
growth. Furthermore, future empirical research will have to unpack existing and potential 
local productivity growth opportunities through forward and backward linkages to other 
sectors and regions as well as to transnational capital. 
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Notes
1 Due to the nature of the illicit drug economy, it is clos to impossible to predict the exact 
economic power of this industry. Holmes et al. (2010) and Franz (2016) make interesting 
estimations for the influence of the illicit economy on the national economy. Moncada 
(2016), Duncan (2013) and Salazar (2012) argue that a sizable amount of Medellín’s 
economic activities depend on the income flows of the drug industry. Particularly the 
sectors of construction and finance are believed to be the main beneficiaries of illicit drug 
income. 
2 The GEA is a conglomerate with a cross-share ownership structure led by the finance and 
insurance company Suramericana de Seguros (Sura), its subsidiary bank Bancolombia, the 
cement producer Argos, and the food processor Nutresa. Today, the GEA controls 
companies in Medellín that make up for around 80% of the city’s GDP and contributes 
around 8% to Colombia’s GDP. Measured by market valorisation, Bancolombia is 
Colombia’s third largest company, while Sura is ranked number four, Argos follows on 
rank six, Nutresa is ranked ninth. Together, these core companies have a market 
valorisation of over 26 billion Pounds Sterling (in 2014 constant GBP). Their combined 
market valorisation makes up for around 25% of the value of all publically traded 
companies in Colombia (Fradique-Méndez, 2014). As such, the GEA reflects the current 
formation of Medellín’s economy. The GEA also presents an insightful case that shows 
how local and regional traditions (regionalismo) play an important role in the way in which 
the economic and political powers are distributed in Colombia’s society.  
3 While Colombia’s traditionally centralised policy regime constrains local agencies in their 
decision making, there exist a verity of different mechanisms through which local 
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governments can engage in active economic policymaking. Decentralisation reforms, such 
as the changes to the management of locally owned public utility provider in 1994 and 
1998, have increased the economic policy influence of local governments (see Furlong, 
2015).   
4 These developments closely correspond to general trends of increased corporate debt in 
less developed countries since 2008. Some observers find links between these 
developments and the Quantitative Easing (QE) policy of the US Federal Reserve, 
implemented between 2008 and 2014. QE provided longer-term private sector credits at 
low interest rates, which aimed at incentivising private investment for the recovery of post-
crisis developed economies. However, the majority of the funds – after being leveraged by 
hedge funds – resulted in an expansion of debt on corporate balance sheets in less 
developed countries. Analysing the links between this policy and dollar credit, McCauley et 
al. (2015) find that between 2009 and 2014 bonds and bank loans to non-bank borrowers 
outside of the US increased from US$6 trillion to US$9 trillion. Palma (2015) finds that for 
Latin America, this flood of cheap US dollar credits had negative impacts for the balance 
sheets of non-bank corporations. 
5 The Compromiso Ciudadano, founded in 2001 by Sergio Fajardo and Alonso Salazar, is a 
coalition of NGO representatives, academics, the business sector, and the media that 
‘focused on how to translate their frustration with Medellín’s political class into action’ 
(Fajardo and Andrews, 2014: 4). Sergio Fajardo has been at the head of this political 
movement focusing on institutional reforms in order to overcome the ‘bastion of old-style 
policy making’ (Devlin and Chaskel, 2010: 3).  
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6 The access to PILA data is restricted. Available data was taken from Ramírez et al. 
(2014).  
7 This article recognises that there are several problems with equating average salary or 
average value added per worker in a particular industrial sector with the productivity 
performance of that sector. For example, price distortions caused by market power of a firm 
in a particular sector can affect wages in ways that have little relation to changes in 
productivity. However, the variable LFP reflects the most accurate and valid proxy for local 
productivity performance available, also given the limited availability of data for the case 
of Medellín. 
8 Classification codes: 151: Production and procession of meat and fish; 158: Other 
foodstuff; 159: Beverages; 172: Weaving of textiles; 173: Finishing of textiles; 174: Other 
textile products; 175: Textile and knitwear; 181: Wearing apparel, except fur; 191: Leather; 
202: Veneer sheets; 243: Millwood, Veneer, Plywood, and Structural Wood Members; 252: 
Rubber products; 271: Basic iron and steel; 289: Fabricated metal products and service 
activities related to metalworking; 292: Machinery of special purpose; 293: Household 
appliances; 331: Medical appliances; 341: Manufacture of paper and paper products; 342: 
Printing, publishing and allied industries; 359: Other transportation equipment; 361: 
Furniture; 369: Other manufacturing industries. 
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